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Abstract
The Cambridge Analytica–Facebook scandal led to widespread concern over the methods deployed by Cambridge
Analytica to target voters through psychographic profiling algorithms, built upon Facebook user data. The scandal
ultimately led to a record-breaking $5 billion penalty imposed upon Facebook by the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) in July 2019. The FTC action, however, has been criticized as failing to adequately address the privacy and
other harms emanating from Facebook’s release of approximately 87 million Facebook users’ data, which was exploited
without user authorization. This Essay summarizes the FTC’s response to the Cambridge Analytica–Facebook scandal. It
concludes that the scandal focuses attention on the need to explore the potential for embedding due process-type
inquiries and protections within the enforcement actions by regulatory agencies such as the FTC. These protections are
increasingly important in addressing the problem of “black boxing the voter” that is now presented by data- and
algorithmic-driven companies such as Cambridge Analytica and Facebook.
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Essay
In Frank Pasquale’s seminal work, The Black Box
Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money
and Information (Pasquale, 2015), published in 2015,
Pasquale observes that algorithms have shifted the
gravitational centering of power in modern society.
“Deconstructing the black boxes of Big Data isn’t
easy,” explains Pasquale, however: “[i]t matters
because authority is increasingly expressed algorithmically” (Pasquale, 2015: 6–8). One year after the
publication of Pasquale’s book, few could have predicted the manner in which algorithmic tools—combined with the sophisticated “networked nature of
modern campaigning” (Hern, 2018)—could potentially
manipulate U.S. voters in the 2016 presidential election. The extent to which Black Box (MayerSch€
onberger and Cukier, 2013) algorithms influenced
the final outcome of the 2016 presidential election is
unknown. What is known, however, is that the
Cambridge Analytica -Facebook scandal of 2018
(Berghel, 2018; Hoofnagle, 2018; Isaak and Hanna,
2018; Kang and Confessore, 2018; Kozlowska, 2018;

Matz et al., 2017; Persily, 2017; The Wharton School
of the University of Pennsylvania, 2018; Ward, 2018)
marks how and when the deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) and voter microtargeting (Barocas, 2012;
Schipper and Woo, 2017) algorithms arrived in the
consciousness of many U.S. voters.
The Cambridge Analytica–Facebook scandal broke
on 17 March 2018 (Lapowsky, 2019), when
Christopher Wylie stepped forward as a corporate
whistleblower and interviewed with the New York
Times and The Observer (Cadwalladr, 2018;
Lapowsky, 2019). Wylie, a Canadian data scientist,
had served as the former Director of Research for
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Cambridge
Analytica
and
SCL
(Strategic
Communication Laboratories) Group, the British
parent company of Cambridge Analytica. Wylie
explained that psychographic profiling enabled
Cambridge Analytica to influence voters through the
exploitation of social media data to create a
“psychological warfare mindf*** tool” (Cadwalladr,
2018; Lapowsky, 2019).
Wylie’s disclosure is often referred to as the
Cambridge Analytica–Facebook scandal in that his initial testimony eventually led to the revelation that an
estimated 87 million Facebook users’ data had been
harvested by a researcher and then exploited by his
company (Kang and Frenkel, 2018). According to
media reports, Cambridge Analytica secured the
Facebook data from Aleksandr Kogan, a data scientist
and psychologist who had been employed as a Lecturer
and Senior Research Associate at the University of
Cambridge from 2012 to 2018 (University of
Cambridge, 2018). Around 2013, Kogan designed a
personality profiling app, claiming that the collection
of user data was for academic research purposes.
Kogan contended that he conformed to Facebook’s
guidelines at the time (University of Cambridge, 2018).
Kogan’s app circulated on Facebook under the title,
“thisisyourdigitallife” and the app operated as a personality quiz (Electronic Privacy Information Center,
2019).
Users
who
downloaded
the
“thisisyourdigitallife” app not only answered questions
about themselves, but also granted the app permission
to access other parts of their profile, including their
“likes,” their contact lists, and more (Electronic
Privacy Information Center, 2019; Granville, 2018).
In a 2016 news interview, Alexander Nix, the former
CEO of Cambridge Analytica, explained that: “we
have somewhere close to four or five thousand data
points on every individual . . . So we model the personality of every adult across the United States, some 230
million people” (Cheshire, 2016). Later, in June 2018,
in testimony before the Digital, Culture, Media, and
Sport Committee of the British Parliament, Nix
explained that Cambridge Analytica also secured commercial data from data brokers such as Acxiom,
Experian, and Infogroup (Lomas, 2018). Through the
purchase of privately aggregated databases compiled
by U.S. companies on U.S. consumers, Nix revealed
that Cambridge Analytica had lawfully acquired millions of data points (Lomas, 2018) on hundreds of millions of U.S. voters. The collected data was then used
to fashion Cambridge Analytica’s targeting algorithms
to predict and influence individual voting behavior in
the 2016 presidential election (Electronic Privacy
Information Center, 2019; Granville, 2018).
Although much of the Cambridge Analytica–
Facebook scandal has focused on Kogan’s acquisition

Big Data & Society
of 87 million Facebook users’ data, Nix denied that the
company relied upon the Kogan data in building its
Black Box algorithms. Instead, in the June 2018 testimony before the British Parliament, Nix explained that
Cambridge Analytica built its algorithms based on the
commercially available data purchased from U.S. companies such as Acxiom, Experian, and Infogroup, combined with publicly and privately available voter data
(Lomas, 2018). Siva Vaidhyanathan explains that there
is a question as to the extent to which the Trump campaign team relied on Cambridge Analytica data rather
than other data: “[W]hen the Trump digital team tried
to use Cambridge Analytica data, it found the older,
more basic data sets offered by the Republican Party to
be more reliable and useful” (Vaidhyanathan, 2019).
In the wake of the Cambridge Analytica–Facebook
scandal, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC, 2019a)
announced an investigation into the matter
(Cambridge Analytica Complaint and Facebook
Complaint). As many experts recognize, this agency
plays an outsized role in upholding data privacy protections in the United States (Bamberger and Mulligan,
2011; Barrett, 2019; Hartzog, 2015; Hoofnagle, 2016;
Pasquale, 2012; Solove and Hartzog, 2014). Yet, the
FTC is unable to address many of the most serious
concerns raised by the Cambridge Analytica–
Facebook scandal. The FTC’s Section 5 authority
under the FTC Act is limited to addressing “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce”
(Facebook Complaint, 2011; Federal Trade Act 1914,
15 U.S.C. § 45 et seq., 2018). The manner in which
the FTC resolved the Cambridge Analytica–
Facebook scandal helped to reveal the uncomfortable
limitations of the FTC’s enforcement authority.
The FTC launched an investigation into Facebook’s
consumer data privacy policies and practices in March
2018 (Romm and Timburg, 2018). The investigation
sought to uncover whether Facebook had violated a
privacy consent agreement it had entered into with
the FTC in 2011 to protect consumers against the
unauthorized disclosure of private user data to third
parties (Granville, 2018). In 2019, Facebook settled
with the FTC (Kang, 2019). The settlement, announced
on 24 July 2019, included a record-setting $5 billion
fine and an FTC Order to institute new privacy standards (Kang, 2019).
As per the FTC Order, for Facebook to disclose
private user information to third parties engaged in
commerce, Facebook must now obtain a user’s express
consent in conjunction with disclosing to the user the
third party’s identity, the categories of nonpublic information disclosed, and that the sharing of such goes
beyond the privacy settings the user has specified
(United States v. Facebook Inc., 2019). Furthermore,
Facebook must restrict third-party access to specified
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user information within 30 days if the user has deleted
information or terminated his or her account.
However, this rule does not apply to situations where
a separate person has shared the user’s deleted information with their own account. Within 120 days of a
user deleting specified user information or terminating
their account, with few exceptions, Facebook must also
delete the information, or make it unidentifiable, on
Facebook’s own servers (United States v. Facebook
Inc., 2019).
Other new privacy regulations instituted by the
Order require Facebook to prohibit third-party applications or websites from requiring or requesting a user
to input their Facebook password to gain access to the
third-party product; to cryptographically protect user
passwords when transmitted over the Internet; and to
delete, cryptographically protect, or render unidentifiable any user passwords stored in Facebook’s data
warehouse (United States v. Facebook Inc., 2019). As
to facial recognition technology, Facebook must obtain
a user’s express consent to use of facial recognition
technology—separate from other data privacy consent
obtained by the company—and must notify the user
how facial recognition will be used and who it will be
shared with, before Facebook can share the facial recognition data with third parties engaged in any commerce (United States v. Facebook Inc., 2019). If these
requirements are not satisfied, Facebook has been
ordered to delete any facial recognition templates it
has stored in connection to third parties engaged in
any commercial activity (United States v. Facebook
Inc., 2019).
Immediately after the FTC announced the terms of
the 2019 settlement, including the $5 billion penalty
that was assessed against Facebook as a result of the
FTC’s investigation into the Cambridge Analytica–
Facebook scandal, privacy experts expressed concern
about the efficacy and rigor of the agency’s enforcement actions. In his dissent to the 2019 settlement
agreement, FTC Commissioner Rohit Chopra
expresses deep reservations over the settlement, stating
that while the FTC managed to generate headlines
through the assessment of a $5 billion penalty, the settlement was inadequate to address Facebook’s behavior (Facebook Chopra Dissent, 2019c). Chopra also
implicitly invites an inquiry into how the $5 billion
penalty was calculated. In his dissent, he notes that in
the FTC’s settlement with Google, the FTC calculated
the company’s unjust gains and then assessed a penalty
that was “more than five times the company’s unjust
gains” (Facebook Chopra Dissent, 2019c). Here,
Chopra observes that not only did the FTC fail to
seek higher penalties, even though higher penalties
may have been available, the FTC also failed to “cite
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to any analysis of Facebook’s unjust enrichment” from
the violation (Facebook Chopra Dissent, 2019c).
Chopra was not the only dissenting voice to speak
out against the FTC’s response. FTC Commissioner
Rebecca Slaughter opined that in order to ensure greater transparency in understanding the nature of the violation, and greater transparency in fashioning the
remedy, proceeding to litigation may have been more
appropriate. Commissioner Slaughter explained in her
dissenting statement that she declined to join the settlement and instead believed that the FTC “should
have initiated litigation against Facebook and its
CEO Mark Zuckerberg. The Commission would
better serve the public interest and be more likely to
effectively change Facebook by fighting for the right
outcome in a public court of law” (Facebook
Slaughter Dissent, 2019b).
Even before the announcement of the $5 billion fine,
David Vladeck, former Director of FTC’s Bureau of
Consumer Protection, had predicted that the FTC
would be “unlikely to investigate the most troubling
aspects of the Cambridge Analytica matter – namely,
the harvesting of user-specific data which was then
deployed to shape that user’s political views, all done
to influence the election” (Vladeck, 2018). He pointed
out that this was “[b]ecause of [the FTC’s] limited statutory authorization and the constraints of the First
Amendment” (Vladeck, 2018). Important scholarship
on the First Amendment implications of social media
and platform regulation go beyond the scope of this
Essay (Bambauer, 2016; Klonick, 2018; Richards,
2013, 2015). The Cambridge Analytica–Facebook
scandal brings into sharp relief a disconcerting question: what due process protections might be available
for algorithmic-based harms that are introduced by private corporations and, consequently, fall outside of
constitutional due process protections. According to
Vladeck: “[t]here should be little doubt that
Facebook user data sharpened Cambridge Analytica’s
algorithms, which made the Trump campaign’s microtargeted messaging more effective” (Vladeck, 2018).
Moving forward, experts have proposed a response
to the Cambridge Analytica–Facebook scandal that
draws upon multiple reforms in law and policy. Some
proposals focus on increasing the effectiveness of the
FTC and include providing the FTC with more resources, such as increased funding and the ability to hire
and retain in-house experts (Barrett, 2019; Hoofnagle
et al., 2019); granting the agency more explicit statutory authority (Maass, 2012; Pasquale, 2012; Vladeck,
2018), such as more clearly defining privacy harms
and abuses that might fall within FTC’s enforcement
(Hartzog, 2015; Hoofnagle, 2016; Solove and Hartzog,
2014); and clarifying other ambiguities in consumer
privacy law (FTC Hearing, 2018). Some look to a
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future that includes FTC promotion of corporate
adopted policies that embrace privacy and securityby-design principles (Hartzog, 2018; McSweeny,
2018), and, relatedly, FTC promotion of selfregulatory reforms that consider data ethics and digital
ethics in day-to-day corporate and product-service governance (Hartzog, 2018; McSweeny, 2018). In increasing the effectiveness of general privacy law, experts also
champion increasing consumer data controls, such as
data portability (Cicilline and McSweeny, 2018);
expanding antitrust law to increase competition and
better serve consumers (Cicilline and McSweeny,
2018; Khan, 2016; Pasquale, 2013); tort law reform
and, for example, one scholar’s proposal to hold companies such as Facebook accountable as information
fiduciaries (e.g. duty of care, duty of loyalty, duty of
confidentiality) (Balkin, 2018); and looking to omnibus
privacy law reforms, such as the adoption of more
comprehensive legal frameworks (Hoofnagle et al.,
2019) that can more directly target the regulation of
algorithmic decision-making.
The Cambridge Analytica–Facebook scandal also
sheds light on the possibility of embedding stronger
due process-type inquiries, including both procedural
and substantive due process, into FTC’s security and
privacy enforcement actions. In recent years, multiple
scholars have proposed due process protections to
guard against Big Data- and algorithmic-based harms
(Citron, 2008; Citron and Pasquale, 2014; Crawford
and Schultz, 2014; Hu, 2016). Other scholars have
called for a more careful academic and legal critique
of Big Data’s impact (Barocas and Selbst, 2016; Boyd
and Crawford, 2012; Eubanks, 2018; Hu, 2016; MayerSch€
onberger and Cukier, 2013; O’Neil, 2016; Richards
and King, 2014; Tene and Polonetsky, 2012). Danielle
Keats Citron’s seminal work on technological due process appears to be an influencing force on the FTC’s
Order (Citron, 2008). Although constitutional due process protections extend to government actions and not
private actions, in prior scholarship, Citron and
Pasquale presciently raised the question of what heightened role the FTC could play in protecting against
classification-based harms posed by an increasingly
algorithmically “scored society” (Citron and
Pasquale, 2014).
Because Cambridge Analytica’s psychographic profiling of U.S. voters poses a threat to the electoral process, the practice should be contextualized as a black
box challenge to democratic institutions broadly. The
FTC’s Order imposes significant regulatory obligations
on Facebook moving forward and more robustly
attempts to protect the data privacy interests of consumers (Facebook Slaughter Dissent, 2019b). The FTC
Order does not safeguard the fundamental constitutional rights that are at risk to U.S. voters through

the deployment of AI and algorithms that aim to disrupt voters’ core freedoms surrounding individual
autonomy and dignity rights. Due process-type inquiries and protections could be embedded within regulatory agencies such as the enforcement actions of the
FTC. The protective actions proposed by Citron and
Pasquale and other experts—such as increasing access
to data sets, requiring greater transparency in algorithms, and requiring algorithmic testing for impact—
are increasingly important. In order to properly
address the problem of “black boxing the voter” that
is now presented by data- and algorithmic-driven companies such as Cambridge Analytica and Facebook, a
more searching inquiry into reform is pressing. Future
developments in law and policy must now evolve to
encompass newly emerging harms posed by black
boxing the voter.
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